UIC Law Review
Volume 36

Issue 4

Article 7

Summer 2003

Privacy to Be Patched in Later - an Examination of the Decline of
Privacy Rights, 36 J. Marshall L. Rev. 985 (2003)
Matthew Hector

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew Hector, Privacy to Be Patched in Later - an Examination of the Decline of Privacy Rights, 36 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 985 (2003)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss4/7
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

PRIVACY TO BE PATCHED IN LATER - AN
EXAMINATION OF THE DECLINE OF PRIVACY
RIGHTS
MATTHEW HECTOR*

"The greatestdangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachmentby men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
INTRODUCTION

"Big Brother is Watching You" is perhaps one of the best-known
quotes from George Orwell's novel, 1984.2 The scope and pervasiveness of
governmental surveillance has not yet reached Orwellian levels. However,
recent changes to the FBI investigation guidelines have restricted privacy
protections. 3 Additionally, the Uniting and Strengthening America By
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act (USA PATRIOT Act) 4 has eroded the Fourth Amendment's protections
against unreasonable search and seizure. 5 Protecting the nation from terrorist
attacks is important; however, maintaining the delicate balance between
privacy and security is of the utmost importance.
J.D. Candidate, expected graduation June 2004.

The author would like to thank
Professor Samuel Olken, Dr. Dan Celander, Patricia Scott, and Anne and Bill Hector for
their guidance, advice, and time during this comment's research and writing process.
1.Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Justice Brandeis argued that all wiretaps are contrary to the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment, involving multiple invasions of privacy to achieve their goals. Id.at 475-76.
"As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping." Id. at 476.
The where and how of an invasion of privacy is immaterial in determining the
Constitutionality of a search and seizure. Id.at 479.
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 5 (The New American Library, Inc. 1981) (1949).
Orwell's vision of the future has yet to come to fruition. However, as technology
develops, and governmental interest in national security increases, the risks to privacy
become greater.
3. See Jerry Berman & James X. Dempsey, CDT's Guide to the FBI Guidelines:
Impact on Civil Liberties and Security - The Need for CongressionalOversight, CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, (June 26, 2002), at http://www.cdt.org/

wiretap/020626guidelines.shtml (last visited July 29, 2003) (outlining the major privacy
issues associated with the May 30, 2002 FBI Guidelines changes, particularly the
expanded scope and duration of preliminary investigations, for which the evidentiary
threshold is low).
4. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 50 U.S.C.).
5. See id. at tit. I1,
§ 201 (allowing law enforcement to use enhanced surveillance
procedures to combat terrorism).
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The right to privacy has been viewed as a fundamental element of
democratic society since the days of Locke and Rousseau. 6 Privacy is not
only essential for human dignity, but it provides valuable protections that are
essential to the functioning of a democratic society.7
The Fourth Amendment arose partially from the Pennsylvania Bill of
Rights, which contained a provision similar to our Fourth Amendment. 8 It
also addressed the general search warrants the British monarchy used to
quell political speech in the Colonies. 9 These influences indicate the
Framers' desire to protect democracy by protecting privacy.' 0 Without this
fundamental "right to be let alone," political speech, and thus the functioning
of our democracy, would be stymied."
In the past, our nation has committed grievous violations of civil
liberties in order to protect the nation's security. The most egregious of
these acts occurred in 1942, when Americans of Japanese decent were
subjected to a military "Civilian Exclusion Order."' 12 In 1944, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that, "when under conditions of modem
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must
be commensurate with the threatened danger."' 13
Unfortunately, in
Korematsu v. United States, the protection offered to the nation was at the
expense of an entire race of citizens. 14 Over fifty years later, we are faced
with another national crisis, one that involves a new kind of modem warfare.
While it is still necessary to protect our nation against terrorist attacks, a
15
valuable lesson can be learned from the gross misstep of Korematsu.

6. See PHILLIPA STRUM, PRIVACY: THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1945

5-11 (Gerald Nash & Richard Etulain eds., 1998) (discussing the historical foundations of
the right to privacy).
7. See id (arguing that privacy is essential for democratic societies).
8. Id. at 9-10.
9. Id. at 10.
10. See id at 1 (arguing that the Constitution was intended to contain a fundamental
right to privacy).

11. Id. at4-6.
12. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944). Under that order, "all
persons of Japanese ancestry [were] excluded from" the Western United States. Id. at 216.
13. Id. at 220.
14. See id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (indicating that as a loyal, native-born
American, Korematsu was not prone to subversive activity). Justice Jackson points out
one should not be penalized for the treasonous acts of "one's antecedents". Id. The logic
behind the Civilian Exclusion Order is therefore fatally flawed; excluding an entire group
of Americans based on race was a serious blow to liberty. Id. at 245-46.
15. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that well-meaning
people, in the name of national security, can trample the privacy rights of others). The
quote from Justice Brandeis that opens this Comment is especially telling in light of the
subsequent example ofKorematsu. Id. Brandeis noted that even the best-intended actions
could have a deleterious effect on liberty as a whole. Id. The American military,
supported by the United States Supreme Court, committed one of the greatest
encroachments on individual liberty in the post-Civil War United States; the individuals
who allowed this to occur were so dedicated to national security that they did not
understand the way their actions would ultimately impact liberty. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at
214.
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This Comment will first examine the development of the right to
privacy, specifically as it is derived from the Fourth Amendment and
jurisprudence from 1928 to the late 1960s. It will then examine how search
and seizure law has impacted privacy rights in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries. The influence of the USA PATRIOT Act on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 16 will be examined; the PATRIOT Act
also has implications in conjunction with the latest FBI Guidelines for
investigating terrorism issued by the Attorney General. 7 The lowered
threshold for obtaining a wiretap warrant, when combined with the
decreased levels of proof required to sustain an informal investigation,
provide some startling implications for the future of privacy rights., 8 This
Comment will examine these implications from a historical and social
context. Finally, this Comment will propose measures that will strike a
careful balance between national security and the right to privacy.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The De-evolution of Privacy Rights in the 20th and 21st Centuries

The right to privacy springs from the Fourth Amendment, as well as
from pre-constitutional sources.' 9 The Search and Seizure Clause of the
Fourth Amendment can be viewed as a response to invasions of privacy
suffered by the Colonists at the hands of the British. 20 For over one hundred
16. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29,
1841-46, 1861-62 (2000) (amended 2001).
17. John Ashcroft, The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes,
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, (May 30, 2002),

available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp (last visited July 21, 2003). This document will be
referred to as "Guidelines."
18. See Berman & Dempsey, supra note 3 (discussing the impact of newly approved
methods of obtaining data such as random web-browsing). Also, the directive permits the
FBI to "subscribe to any commercial or non-profit profiling and data mining service." Id.
The evidentiary threshold has plummeted to the point that almost any scintilla of suspicion
is enough to justify a preliminary investigation. Id. Another problematic change is the
length of time an investigation can continue for without producing any true evidence of
wrongdoing. Id.
19. STRUM, supra note 6, at 9-11. A portion of the Constitution's Bill of Rights is
based on the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights. Id. at 9-10. Enacted in 1754, the Pennsylvania
Bill of Rights states as follows:
The people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions
free from search and seizure; and therefore warrants, without oaths or affirmations
first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any officer or
messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize
any person or persons, his or their property not particularly described, are contrary
to that right, and ought not be granted.
Id. at 9. This foundation of the notion of privacy has been shaken by the revised FBI
Guidelines. See Berman & Dempsey, supra note 3 (demonstrating that the evidentiary
threshold for invading the privacy of an individual is so low that it negates the concept of
sufficient foundation for a warrant).
20. STRUM, supra note 6, at 10. Invasions of privacy committed by the British include
the following: political surveillance, requiring a license for the publication of all books

The John MarshallLaw Review

[36:985

21
years, American jurisprudence was largely silent on the issue of privacy.
Although a handful of Supreme Court opinions may have dealt with privacy
issues earlier, Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States22 that
case highlighted the idea that technological advances should not bar a citizen
from protecting his or her right to privacy.
The intent of the framers,
Brandeis argued, was to "protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions, and their sensations." 24 Drawing on his 1890 law review
article, he found that protection in the right to privacy was implied in the
Constitution. 25 As the legal community absorbed Justice Brandeis' ideas,
change slowly began to occur in American privacy jurisprudence.
By the mid-1960s, the Supreme Court began to lean towards a reading
of the Fourth Amendment that was similar to Brandeis' reading. 26 In Katz v.
United States,2 7 the majority, speaking through Justice Stewart, expanded the
right to privacy.28 The Court abandoned the physical invasion test29 of

and pamphlets, requiring that all of the same bear the name of the author, and quartering
troops in the homes of Colonists. Id.
21. See id. at 3 (noting that Samuel D. Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis' December
1890 article, The Right to Privacy, in the Harvard Law Review, was the first American
argument that there was a fundamental and "identifiable 'right to privacy"').
22. 277 U.S. at 438.
23. Id. at 475. "There is, in essence, no difference between the sealed letter and the
private telephone message." Id. Brandeis continued to point out that wiretapping is more
invasive than intercepting a letter. Id.at 475-76. Brandeis also discussed the interplay
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, stating that obtaining evidence in violation of
the Fourth Amendment and then using it in a trial also violates the Fifth Amendment
protection against self-incrimination. Id. at 476-78. Brandeis moved away from the
majority's literal interpretation of the Constitution, stressing that while the framers could
not have contemplated the act of wiretapping, the Constitution was intended to protect
against many types of governmental violations of privacy. Id. His dissent also
acknowledges that over time, new methods of invading the privacy of citizens would
become available, perhaps even one day, "[the government] will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home." Id. at 474.
24. Olnstead,277 U.S. at 478.
25. Id. In addition to each invasion being a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
Brandeis equates any use of improperly obtained evidence as a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 476-78. Brandeis argued that this marriage of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments necessarily made wiretapping unconstitutional. Id. Brandeis acknowledged
the need to balance the interests of law enforcement against the rights of the people. Id.at
479. However, at the time, many states had made wiretapping illegal. Id. at 480. Justice
Brandeis argues that federal agents should not be allowed to collect evidence through a
method that violates the laws of the states. Id.
26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (adopting a right to privacy).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 353. This was the result of the gradual development of other privacy cases,
especially those related to search and seizure. Id. Ultimately, Katz overturned Olmstead
and adopted the Brandeis analysis of a more expansive, functionalist reading of the Fourth
Amendment, abandoning the strict physical invasion reading taken by the majority in the
Olmstead Court. Id. "To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication." Id. at 352. By
acknowledging that changes in technology have required re-defining the scope of the
Fourth Amendment, the Katz Court took the focus off of literal physical invasion. Id.at
353.
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earlier decisions, which required an actual physical entry into a protected
area, like a residence, to establish a violation of privacy. 30 The Court
adopted a new, person-centric 31 test. 32 This test required demonstrating an
expectation of privacy; however, that expectation had to be reasonable.33
In Katz, the petitioner used a public telephone booth with the door
closed.34 The Court recognized this attempt to maintain privacy and
acknowledged that the expectation of privacy in a phone booth was
reasonable because Katz had taken affirmative steps to guarantee his
privacy.35 The Court acknowledged that regardless of the manner of the
search, its legality required a warrant.36 This warrant requirement for
electronic searches echoed the tone of Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead.37 The
Court held that regardless of the specific scope of the wiretap, it did not
release the agents from their Fourth Amendment obligation to obtain a
specific warrant. 38 The individual's right to privacy was gaining popular

29. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463-64. The majority, speaking through Chief Justice Taft,
applied a physical test to determine a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Essentially,
if investigators did not physically enter the "private quarters of the defendant," they had
not committed a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 464. The
Court further tried to differentiate between the interception of physical objects, like letters,
and the interception of oral communications, like phone calls. Id.
30. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (noting that the issue is not whether physical places are
protected by the Fourth Amendment, but whether people are protected by the Fourth
Amendment).
31. Id. The Court held that the umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection attached to
the individual, not physical locations. Id. If an individual seeks to keep something
private, it is protected by the Constitution. Id.
32. Id. "[Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people, not places .... [W]hat he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected." Id.
33. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. For Justice Harlan, the fact that the petitioner had closed
the telephone booth door was key. Id Had the petitioner been having a conversation with
someone in the open, outside the confines of a telephone booth and the telephone wires, he
would not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
35. Id. Harlan articulated a two-pronged test for evaluating whether an individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited [sic] an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' Id. Standing nude in one's window would not
demonstrate an expectation of privacy, nor would one speaking in a crowded bar be
recognized as demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id
36. Id at 356. The Court further held that the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement did not apply to electronic searches. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-58.
Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual's
arrest could hardly be deemed an 'incident' of that arrest. Nor could the use of
electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of 'hot
pursuit.' And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use
pursuant to the suspect's consent.
Id. The Court did not, however, answer the question of whether this rule applied to
matters of national security. Id.
37. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (indicating that non-physical, technologically
advanced searches demand Fourth Amendment protection).
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59. Cf Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J.,
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39
support and a foothold in the political community.
However, this right, vested in the individual, was not without its limits.
Terry v. Ohio 40 addressed the question of "the scope of a policeman's power
when he confronts a citizen without probable cause to arrest him."'
A
plain-clothed police officer observed petitioner, Terry, apparently casing a
store. 42 The officer approached Terry and his associates in an attempt to
further ascertain their purpose.43 After brief questioning, the officer spun
45
44
Terry around and frisked him. The search revealed a concealed revolver.

The circumstances surrounding the search were the crux of Terry's
objections to the introduction of the gun at trial.46 The Supreme Court took
issue with the holdings of the lower courts that a stop could be distinguished
from a seizure.47 Chief Justice Warren also took issue with the lower courts'
holdings that a frisk was not a search. 48 The Court refused to modify its past
dissenting) (noting that writs of assistance and general warrants seem similar to wiretaps,
as they allow any person at any time and place to be searched). See also STRUM, supra
note 6, at 115 (discussing writs of assistance and general warrants). Allowing lawenforcement agents to police themselves in the process of wiretapping could lead to abuse,
no matter how specific the wiretap. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59.
39. STRUM, supra note 6, at 121. President Johnson's stated, in his January 1967 State
of the Union Address, that "We should protect what Justice Brandeis called the 'right most
valued by civilized men' - the right to privacy." Id.
40. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. Id.at 16. A key issue in Terry was balancing the rights of the individual (the
reasonable expectation of privacy) against the public interest of law enforcement officers
neutralizing a potentially dangerous, armed individual. Id. at 10-11. To guide this
balancing act, the Court adopted the standards set forth by Justice Harlan in Katz. Id.at 9.
However, the fuzzy notion of a "reasonable" expectation of privacy has led to further
ambiguity in Fourth Amendment search and seizure interpretation. STRUM, supra note 6,
at 123.
42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6. Officer McFadden, the arresting officer, alleged that the
behavior of Terry and his associate was typical of criminals preparing to perform an armed
robbery. Id.
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id.at 7-8. The trial court denied Terry's objection to the introduction of the gun
into evidence. Id. at 8. Special attention was paid to the language used to describe the
encounter between Terry and Officer McFadden. Terry, 392 U.S. at 8. The trial court,
and later the appellate court, held that a stop and frisk was distinguishable from a search
and seizure. Id.
47. Id. at 16. Chief Justice Warren reasoned that not every seizure must take the form
of an arrest. Id. The threshold for seizure of a person is when that person is not free to
walk away, or when that freedom has been restrained. Id.
48. Id. at 16-17. Chief Justice Warren's indignation that the lower courts would
trivialize the nature of a public body search is apparent from his choice of words. Terry,
392 U.S. at 16-17.
[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a
careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her
body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' Moreover, it is simply
fantastic to urge that such a procedure preformed in public by a policeman while
the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty
indignity.'
Id. Chief Justice Warren was especially wary of the distinction between terms because of
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positions that an initially acceptable search can violate the Fourth
Amendment.49
In assessing the constitutionality of the officer's actions, the Court
stressed the need to balance the public interest against the rights of the
individual. 50 The Court held that given the observations of the officer
leading up to the search of Terry, the officer was justified in searching Terry
to protect his own safety, and that of others .5 Terry may have expected that
the contents of his pockets would remain private; however, the
Court
2
reasoned that suspicious condtict would vitiate the right to privacy.
Katz was merely making a phone call;53 Terry was casing a store. 4
While Terry dealt with physical searches of citizens by the police, the
reasoning of the Court has been applied to various types of search and
seizure cases since 1968." 5
In the realm of drug-related law-enforcement, the Supreme Court
seems to have developed two different standards.56 In Kyllo v. United States,
two federal agents used a thermal imager to scan Kyllo's home.57 This scan
produced infrared emissions from Kyllo's home, indicating the possibility of
marijuana cultivation inside the house.5 8 At trial, Kyllo contested the

the implications for the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 17.
49. Id. at 19. This inquiry must be fact-based, pertaining to the specifics of each
encounter with the police. Id. In light of the development of this branch of Fourth
Amendment rights, the Court stated that the "scope of the particular intrusion, in light of
all the exigencies of the case" was the crucial factor in determining whether a search was
reasonable. Id. The Court felt that attempting to give an exact definition to the terms
search and seizure would risk judicial review taking on legislative qualities not delegated
to the courts. Id.
50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-1. This balancing of policies necessarily requires initial
accountability on the part of the officer. Id. at 21. Without additional accountability on
the part of the courts, a stop and frisk by a police officer, based on "subjective good faith,"
becomes equivalent to a general warrant. See id at 22 (noting that if "subjective good
faith" really is the only test for justifying searches and seizures, people are no longer
"secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects").
51. Idat30-31.
52. Id.
53. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
54. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6.

55. STRUM, supra note 6, at 125. Strum points out that the trend in the 1980s and
1990s was towards situational favoring of the interest of law enforcement over individual
rights. Id Specifically, drug-related and drunk driving search and seizure cases have been
decided in favor of law enforcement. Id.
56. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (placing sense-enhanced searches
of a home within the scope of the Fourth Amendment). Cf Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429 (1991) (holding that all encounters between police and passengers on a bus are not
seizures per se) and United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding that searches
of bus passengers, even if made without probable cause, were not coercive or subject to
Fourth Amendment protections). This split seems largely based on electronic versus
physical searches.
57. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
58. Id. While the scan did not prove the presence of marijuana plants within Kyllo's
home, the cumulative effect of this scan and other tips was enough to justify a search
warrant. Id. at 30.
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validity of the warrant used to obtain this scanner evidence. 59 The trial court
upheld the warrant, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that it met the
requirements of the Katz and Terry tests of reasonable expectation of
privacy. 60 The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the lower
courts, unwilling to allow technological advancements to further erode the
reasonable expectation of privacy that has existed since Katz.6 1 Viewed in
the scope of Olmstead and Katz, Kyllo echoes Justice Brandeis' fear that
technological advances could disastrously erode privacy,
even if the means
62
provide a seemingly less invasive method of searching.
However, in two other recent cases, the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to extend the protection of the Fourth Amendment to low-tech,63
warrantless, suspicionless searches of bus passengers. Florida v. Bostick
carries forward the concept that a Terry stop can become unconstitutional if
coercion is present.64 The Court left the decision to the Florida Supreme
Court to determine on remand whether questioning within the confines of a
6
bus was coercive. 65 In United States v. Drayton,66
the Court expanded upon
Bostick, flatly refusing to require that law enforcement officers inform
citizens that warrantless searches are voluntary.67 It would seem reasonable
that absent suspicious behavior, the contents of one's pockets would be
private; however, these cases illustrate that the Terry standard has eroded

59. Id.

60. Id. at 31. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo's failure to conceal the
heat emissions negated his reasonable expectation of privacy, and that given the nature of
the search, his expectation of privacy was not objectively reasonable. Id.
61. Id. at 34. Specifically, Justice Scalia stated, "there is a ready criterion, with roots
deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and that is
acknowledged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment." Id. Justice Scalia reasoned that the Court was unwilling to further erode
the Katz test for the benefit of law enforcement, noting the slippery slope created by
encroaching on the accepted boundaries of the reasonable expectation of privacy. Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 35-36.
62. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (writing that "in the
application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but of
what may be").
63. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429.
64. Id. at 437. Specifically, officers cannot state that compliance with a request to be
searched is mandatory. Id. The Court also stated that the reasonable person standard for
determining coercion presupposes an innocent person. Id. at 438.
65. Id. at 437. The Court reasoned that its refusal to determine whether the nature of
the request to search was constitutional was to maintain the holding of Terry. Id. at 439.
However, in Terry, the Court did address whether the specific facts of the case breached
Fourth Amendment protections. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. A possible explanation for this
discrepancy can be seen in the Bostick Court's dicta: "this Court is not empowered to
forbid law enforcement practices simply because it considers them distasteful." Bostick,
501 U.S. at 439.
66. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194.
67. Id. at 206-7. The Court also carried forward the reasonable innocent person
language. Id. at 201-02. In support of its decision that bus stops of this nature are not

coercive per se, the Court pointed to the freedom of the passenger to leave the bus. Id. at
205.
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since the 1960s.
The reasonable expectation of privacy has been further complicated by
the advent of the Internet and digital phones. 68 As technology advances, law
enforcement has an interest in using it to enhance its ability to investigate
69
criminal activity.
Since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 70 was passed in
1978, wiretaps using the national security loophole from Katz have increased
at an alarming rate. 71 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
had never turned down a request for an intelligence wiretap until May 17,
2002.72 In its first publicly released opinion, the FISC cited governmental
admission of material errors in seventy-five warrant applications. 73 In its
opinion, the FISC held that further information sharing between criminal and
intelligence investigators corrupts the intent of FISA.74 The August 22
release of the FISC opinion resulted in demands for greater oversight of the
FISA process,
particularly the activities of the FBI and the Justice
7
Department. 75

Even more telling for the development of privacy law is that
government intelligence gathering is nothing new. 76 Current FISA standards
are not as permissive as past governmental espionage, but as new
technologies arise, so do new concerns. 77 In addition to the clamoring

68. STRUM, supra note 6, at 159-60.
69. Id.
70. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, 1821-29,
1841-46, 1861-62 (2000) (amended 2001).
71. STRUM, supra note 6, at 160. According to the Justice Department, the FISA
Court permitted "207 [taps] in 1979, 512 in 1987, and 576 in 1994." Id.
72. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, (FISC
May
17, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics
/transcripts/fisa-opinion.pdf (last visited July 23, 2003). These wiretaps had been
permissively granted under the lowered probable cause standard implemented under FISA.
Id. at9.
73. Id. at 16. These mistakes and omissions related in part to whether an investigation
blended a criminal investigation with a FISA investigation. Id. at 17. This blending of
investigations and sharing of information is prohibited under FISA. Id
74. Id. at 22.
75. Nat Hentoff, Who Watches the Secret FISA Court?, THE WASH. TiMES, Sept. 2,
2002, at A 19. Hentoff demands that the FISC explain its past permissiveness. Id. He also
takes Congress to task for not exercising greater oversight over the FBI and the Justice
Department. Id.
76. John Podesta & Peter Swire, Speaking Out About Wiretaps, THE WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 2002, at A23. Of note are the FBI's CO1NTELPRO and the CIA's Operation
Chaos, which kept tabs on various political groups. Id. Martin Luther King, Jr., Senators
Adlai E. Stevenson III and Eugene McCarthy, and groups like the ACLU and the NAACP,
were all targets of these two government intelligence programs. STRUM, supra note 6, at
150.
77. Bruce Fein, What FISA Did and Didn't Do, THE WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at
A 14. If a FISA search produces information that can lead to prosecution, the potential
defendant cannot access necessary documents to challenge the validity of the warrant
because, "the statute mandates in camera, ex parte review by the district court." Id.
Further, the government is free to keep almost any information on a subject as long as it
meets the low threshold of evidentiary relevancy set by the statute. Id.
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amongst the media, civil rights groups are concerned about the impact of the
recent changes to intelligence gathering rules.78
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Digital Space and Communications - A Brave New Virtual World

With the advent of the Internet, new privacy issues have arisen
regarding e-mail, websites and the servers that store them, and message
boards. 79 Congress has made efforts to codify new privacy rules for this
brave new virtual world, particularly the Electronic Communication Privacy
Act (ECPA). 80 For instance, the Wiretap Act 8' required that investigators
obtain warrants for electronic surveillance, even in espionage cases.82 This
statutory requirement, however, has been pushed aside by the Executive
Branch in the name of national security.8 3 Although this "loophole" is only
applied to foreign agents and those
suspected of being foreign agents, the
84
potential for abuse seems clear.
The misuse and abuse of semantics is also eroding privacy in this new
area of the law. Though not involving search and seizure, Konop v.
HawaiianAirlines, Inc.85 sets a disturbing precedent for the interpretation of
the ECPA.86 Konop, an employee of Hawaiian Airlines, maintained a
website where he actively voiced his criticisms of the company, the

78. See Berman & Dempsey, supra note 3 (outlining the Center for Democracy and
Technology's concerns about the May 30, 2002 FBI Guideline revisions). The Center for
Democracy and Technology has taken multiple exceptions with the new Attorney General
Guidelines for FBI General Investigations. Id. Additionally, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC), has voiced concerns about the recently released FISC opinion,
and the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act on privacy rights. FBI Official Claims 'Love of
Freedom' Despite Wiretap Abuses, 20 LONG-DISTANCE COMPETITION REPORT No. 18,
(Sept. 2, 2002).
79. STRUM, supra note 6, at 157-58.
80. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
This amended version of the statute corrected the notion that only aural communications
were shielded by the Wiretap Act of 1968. The Wiretap Act was codified as 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (2000) (amended 1986). The ECPA extended privacy protections to various
new forms of communication devices including e-mail, cell phones, voice and text pagers,
and computer transmissions. 18 U.S.C § 2511 (2000). See also STRUM, supra note 6, at
158 (describing the constraints the ECPA puts on "the government's ability to intercept
and record new forms of electronic ... communication.").
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000) (amended 1986).
82. STRUM, supra note 6, at 158.
83. Id. "[E]very president since [the Wiretap Act's] passage has ignored this provision
with the assertion that the president has the inherent power to wiretap ... suspected
foreign agents." Id.
84. Id.
85. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
86. Id at 872. The Ninth Circuit withdrew a previous decision in the case, Konop v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001), changing the opinion to affirm a
district court ruling that held Konop's Wiretap Act claim did not meet the standards
established by the ECPA. Id.
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executives, and the current union.8 7 Konop had secured the site with a
username and password system, which included explicit terms of use.88 The
court did not reach the issue of whether Konop had a reasonable expectation
of privacy under the Wiretap Act; these measures were indicative of that
expectation. 89 Just like Katz had closed91 the door to his phone booth, 90
Konop had closed the door to his website.
The Ninth Circuit, however, escaped the reasonable expectation issue
with dubious readings of the Wiretap Act, the ECPA, and the USA
PATRIOT Act. 92 The Court reasoned that since Congress had eliminated
"stored electronic communications" from both the definition of wire and
electronic communication, a communication can only be "intercepted"
during its original transmission, and not when retrieved from storage. 93
This distinction is troubling. While the Court used the plain-language
definition of "intercept" in its decision, 94 it failed to understand the essential
nature of how the World Wide Web functions. Unlike a phone call, which is
communicated at the moment of creation, an electronic transmission, like
loading a web page in a browser, differs. When a user visits a specific
Uniform Resource Locator, the speech contained on the web page is
transmitted contemporaneously to the user. 95 Each page load becomes its

87. Konop, 302 F.3d at 872.
88. Id. at 872-73. These terms of use included provisions forbidding access to the site
by any member of the airline's management. Id. at 873. The terms of use also prohibited
the dissemination of the site's contents. Id.
89. See id. at 872-73 (outlining the measures Konop took to secure his website).
Similar to the privacy of a phone booth, a secured website should be treated as if its user
expects privacy. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the notion
of a reasonable expectation of privacy). Konop implemented the password and user
agreement system to limit access. Konop, 302 F.3d at 872-73. This is similar to calling
someone on the phone, where the expectation is that only the intended recipient receives
the communication.
90. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
91. Konop, 302 F.3d at 872-73.
92. Id. at 876-79. The Ninth Circuit pointed to the standard established by the Wiretap
Act to demonstrate that Congress had differentiated between stored electronic and wire
communications when drafting the Act. Id. at 877. Specifically, the Court cited the
following section of the Wiretap Act as modified by the ECPA:
Until October 2001, "wire communication" was defined as "any aural transfer
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of
communications by the aid of wire, cable or other like connection between the
point of origin and the point of reception ... and such term includes any electronic
storageof such communication..."
Id., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000).
(Emphasis added by the court).
93. Konop, 302 F.3d at 878. This distinction is aided by the USA PATRIOT Act; in
enacting this statute, Congress removed "stored electronic communication" from the
definition of wire communications. Id.
94. Id. at 878. The Court defined "intercept" as meaning, "to stop, seize, or interrupt
in progress or course before arrival." Id.
95. Surf the Web: How the Web Works, LEARNTHENET.COM, (2003), at
http://www.leamthenet.com/english/index.html (last visited July 22, 2003).
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own communication to the recipient. 96 Therefore, the contemporaneous
communication resulting from a page load can be intercepted within the
Ninth Circuit's definition.
The dissenting opinion in Konop highlighted some other difficulties
with the majority's decision. 97 Citing a past Ninth Circuit decision, the
dissent pointed out that in determining whether a wire communication has
been intercepted, the court rejected a contemporaneous transmission
requirement. 9 8 The dissent further argued that this contradiction creates a
massive loophole in the electronic communications clause of the ECPA. 99
Under the Ninth Circuit's reading of the ECPA, most electronic
communications do not enjoy protection, providing a foothold for
warrantless electronic searches by federal law enforcement.100
B. Beyond the Civil Ream -The Delimitationof the FourthAmendment
1. Thinning the Bright Line between Intelligence and Criminal
Investigations
On May 17, 2002, the FISC did something it had never done before: it
denied the Department of Justice a foreign intelligence surveillance
warrant.' 0 ' The Department of Justice had filed a motion with the FISC
seeking to almost fully remove the minimization and separation procedures
required under the FISA, and as established by past Attorney General
Guidelines. 102
The FISC acknowledged that the primary role of the FISA is not only
to preserve national security in the present, but also to look forward toward
preserving "a constitutional democracy under the rule of law."' 1 3 The court
96. Id.
97. Konop, 302 F.3d at 886 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent finds that "stored
electronic communications" should not be exempt from the protections of the ECPA. Id.
at 886-87.
98. Id.at 887. The dissent also found that there was no justification for holding
differently for electronic communications, especially since doing so would effectively

eviscerate the decision regarding wire communications. Id.
at 887-88.
99. Id.
at 888.
100. Id.
101. Anne Gearan, Court's Ruling May Test Domestic Spying Powers, THE RECORD
(BERGEN COUNTY, N.J.), August 24, 2002, at AO1.
102. In re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 1. Minimization procedures are

designed to protect the privacy rights of Americans by requiring that information that does
not lead to a deeper investigation be destroyed.

Id.at 12.

"Wall" procedures are

information screening procedures that guarantee any information shared between
intelligence and criminal investigators is only that which is necessary to further the
criminal investigation. Id.
at 15-16.

103. Id. at 5. While the FISC casts itself in the role of the arbiter of the FISA's higher
purpose, the Court declined to rule on the Department of Justice's assertion that the
primary purpose of FISA was now law enforcement. Id.
at 6 n.2. The Attorney General
made the assertion on March 6, 2002, that after the USA PATRIOT Act's amendments to
the FISA, the FISA could "be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, so long as a
significant foreign intelligence purpose remains." Id.See also John Ashcroft, Intelligence
Sharing Procedures for Foreign Intelligence and Foreign Counterintelligence
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acknowledged that the minimization procedures and information sharing
procedures were already intrusive, their scope already codified into the
FISA. 10 4 In particular, the court noted that the foreign intelligence standard
of probable cause was significantly lower than the criminal standard, and
that investigators only had to show
the potential for a facility to be used for
10 5
espionage or terrorist activities.
In addition to these lowered standards, the minimization rules are
significantly lax, presenting problems for a defendant in a trial where the
government is using FISA-based evidence.'0 6
Given the past
misrepresentations made to the FISC by Department of Justice officials,
allowing the Attorney General's office to prevent a defendant from accessing
the warrants and applications used to obtain evidence by submitting an
affidavit to the trial court seems akin to letting the fox guard the henhouse.
In an effort to prevent the Department of Justice from "[amending] the
[FISA] in ways Congress has not," the court rejected section 1iB and III of
the government's
application for reduced minimization and wall
07
standards.
Preserving the FISA probable cause standard for primarily foreign
intelligence investigations was a positive step towards protecting the rights
of citizens. However, by failing to address the Department of Justice's
allegation that the USA PATRIOT Act authorized the use of FISA for
primarily criminal investigative purposes, the Court left the door open for
further Department of Justice abuses of the FISA.'8
Investigations Conducted by the FBI, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, (March 6,

2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (last visited July
23, 2003) (making this assertion).
104. In reAll Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 9-1I.
105. Id. at 9-10.
106. Id. at 12. Information is only minimized if it "could not be foreign intelligence."
Id. Additionally, any information used in a prosecution, and the orders and applications
associated with it, are largely inaccessible to the party being investigated. Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1825(g) (2000). In particular,
§ 1825(g) states:
In camera and ex parte review by district court ... whenever any motion or request
is made by an aggrieved person ... to discover or obtain applications or orders or
other materials relating to a physical search authorized by this subchapter ... the
United States district court ...

shall ...

review in camera and ex parte the

application, order, and such other materials relating to the physical search as may
be necessary to determine whether the physical search of the aggrieved person was
lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this determination, the court may
disclose to the aggrieved person .... only where such disclosure is necessary to
make an accurate determination of the legality of the physical search.
Id As a result of this in camera and ex parte review of FISA warrants, it becomes difficult
for a defendant to argue for suppression of evidence resulting from a FISA search. As
seen above, the FBI has admitted to multiple misstatements and falsehoods in 75 different
FISA warrant applications, making this provision exceptionally difficult to swallow. In re
All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 16.
107. In re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 22-23.
108. Id. at 6. The language of the Attorney General's memorandum is still open to
abuse, as the court did not address the primary purpose issue. Id The Attorney General's
assertions are not directly supported by the text of the USA PATRIOT Act which states:
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2. Dimming the Bright Line Between Criminaland Intelligence
Investigations
The FISA, as amended by the USA PATRIOT Act, mandates a
significant foreign intelligence purpose for a FISA application. 0 9 However,
FISA also specifically states that the information sought must be foreign
intelligence information."10
The FISA definition section does not
specifically include
evidence
of
domestic crimes as foreign intelligence
I
information. '
In its appellate brief to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review, the Department of Justice attempted to justify its reading of the
USA PATRIOT Act's amendments to the FISA." 2 In particular, the
Department of Justice argued that current minimization practices allow for
intelligence investigators to disseminate information to criminal
investigators. '' 3 However, the brief takes a dangerous misstep in logic in
attempting to reverse this equation.' 14 Allowing criminal investigators to use
the lower FISA standard to obtain surveillance
warrants effectively removes
5
the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 1

Each application for an order approving electronic surveillance under this
subchapter shall be made by a Federal officer ....

Each application shall require

the approval of the Attorney General based upon his finding that it satisfies the
criteria and requirements of such application as set forth in this subchapter ....
(A) that the certifying official deems the information sought to be foreign
intelligence information; (B) that a significant purpose of the surveillance is to
obtain foreign intelligence information; (C) that such information cannot
reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques.
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2000).
109. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7) (2000).
110. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(D) (2000).
111. Id. § 1801(e) (2000).
112. Brief for the United States, In the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review, (FISC Aug. 21, 2002) (No. 02-001), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/082102appeal.html (last visited July 24, 2003).
113. Id. The Government argued that this dissemination is distinctly codified in the
FISA as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act. Id. The purpose behind allowing intelligence
investigators to disseminate information to criminal investigators is to secure action
against a terrorist or foreign agent without exposing national security issues. Id.
114. Id. The Government argues that there is "no constitutional basis for distinguishing
between law enforcement efforts and other means of protecting this country against
foreign spies and terrorists." Id. While allowing an intelligence investigator to refer a
target to the criminal division for further investigation, appropriate minimization
procedures can prevent a wholesale violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. However,
allowing criminal investigators, who have a greater burden of proof to obtain surveillance
warrants, to use the FISA burden of proof raises the specter of general warrants and writs
of assistance as discussed in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead. See Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining the historical origins and reasoning
behind the Fourth Amendment).
115. See Brief for the United States, supra note 112 (outlining the government's
argument for invading the privacy of individuals in the name of national security). The
Department of Justice argues that using the FISA to obtain evidence for a criminal
prosecution could have a foreign intelligence purpose if the target is potentially a threat to

national security. Id.
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3. Crossingthe Line: The May 30, 2002 Attorney General'sGuidelines on
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterpriseand Terrorism Enterprise
Investigations
Thirteen days after the FISC rejected the March 6, 2002, application for
new minimization procedures, the Department of Justice released revised
Guidelines for the FBI's various investigative branches." 16 The USA
PATRIOT Act indicated that racketeering enterprises may fall under the
umbrella of terrorism enterprise investigations.! 7 Additionally, the new
Guidelines designate strategies for bringing investigations under the lower
evidentiary standard required for terrorism investigations."'
While the Guidelines are aimed at prevention and early detection of a
threat to national security, or the potential commission of a crime, the
methods authorized for even a simple background check and information
gathering are cause for concern.
When dealing with a terrorism
investigation, the Attorney General has given the FBI wide discretion in the
methods it may use to gather information.' 9 For instance, instead of
browsing the World Wide Web as part of an investigation or inquiry, the FBI
is now authorized to randomly search for evidence of a potential crime,
regardless of whether it is a terrorist act. 20 Further, the FBI is authorized to
attend any public gathering or place to monitor activities there, with the
caveat that "[n]o information obtained from such visits shall be retained
unless it relates to potential criminal or terrorist activity."' 21 This caveat is
dubious at best.
The Guidelines also extend the duration of a terrorism investigation to
one year, renewable for up to a year at a time.'22 Investigations of all types
may utilize any lawful methods, balancing the intrusiveness of those
116. Guidelines, supra note 17.

117. Id.
at 3. The USA PATRIOT Act enumerates the various activities that constitute
a federal crime of terrorism, including, but not limited to, possession of plastic explosives,

arson and bombing of property used in interstate commerce, torture, and various
associations with terrorist organizations. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(B) (2001).
118. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 4-5. Three triggers for a terrorism investigation are,
"threats or advocacy of violence or other covered criminal acts," "apparent ability or intent
to carry out violence or other covered activities," and "potential federal crime." Id.This

proactive stance looks towards early prevention.
119. Id. at 18-23. These new Guidelines have raised flags amongst various civil
liberties groups, such as the Center for Democracy and Technology. See Berman &
Dempsey, supra note 3 (indicating that the decreased supervision of investigators,
combined with intrusive methods and long term data-retention, threatens privacy rights).
120. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 22. See also Berman & Dempsey, supra note 3

(browsing the World Wide Web allows investigators to randomly search, without probable
cause, to gather information that may or may not result in the detection of terrorist
activity).
121. Guidelines, supra note 17, at 22. However, the elements of terrorist activity are to
be viewed as a whole, giving a large amount of latitude to investigators. Id.at 4. The
guidelines state that words and actions combined may create a terrorist threat that triggers
the lower evidentiary standard. Id.Additionally, appearing ready and able to commit acts
of violence can bring an individual under the terrorism umbrella. Id.
at 5.
122. Id. at 17-18.

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:985

methods against the perceived threat.'2 3 Given the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Konop, 2 4 the scope of what might be considered a lawful method has
expanded.
For instance, if all page loads from a secured web site are to be
considered exempt from the protections of the ECPA 2 5 and the Wiretap
Act,12 6 then FBI agents can access those sites without a warrant. This
loophole is apparent from that part of the new Guidelines where
authorization is given to the FBI to "access online sites and forums as part of
such research on the same terms and conditions as members of the public
127
generally."'
Additionally, reasonable people might not want FBI agents secretly
attending and monitoring their political, religious, or social functions. Part
of the motivation for the Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, and our Fourth
Amendment, was to prevent the squelching of political speech enacted via
general warrants and writs of assistance. 28 While it is important to protect
our nation from those who would harm it, a balance with civil rights must be
forged.
III.

OVERSIGHT AND UNIFORMITY-A POLICY PROPOSAL

This Proposal will address policy choices that should be made to ensure
that the goals of national security are balanced against the privacy rights our
nation seeks to protect. First, it will address the need for increased
Congressional oversight of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Second,
it will present the legislation and policy choices necessary to achieve the
goal of increased oversight. Third, this Proposal will discuss the need for
uniform definitions within the Wiretap Act' 29 and the ECPA. 30
A.

Who Watches the Watchers? The Need For CongressionalOversight

In 1976, Attorney General Edward Levi drafted the precursor to the
current Attorney General Guidelines,' 3' the FBI Domestic Security
Guidelines. 32 These Domestic Security Guidelines were a substitute for
legislative regulation of the FBI. 133 Although it was never made part of the
United States Code, it was understood that any revisions to these Guidelines
would be "subject to prior Congressional review and public input."' 34 The
123. Id. at 18.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Konop, 302 F.3d at 868.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523 (2000).
The Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2523 (2000) (amended 1986).
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 22.
See STRUM, supra note 6, 8-10 (indicating various factors that contributed to the

drafting of the Fourth Amendment).
129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000) (amended 1986).
130. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
131. Guidelines, supra note 17.
132. See Berman & Dempsey, supra note 3 (describing how this initial set of
Guidelines was amended and reissued by the Carter and the Reagan administration).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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new FBI Guidelines released by Attorney General Ashcroft did not receive
any such review.1 35 While this breach of convention may have expedited the
response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the new Guidelines
until May 30, 2002, thirteen days after the
themselves were not released
36
FISC opinion was decided.'
As shown above, the FBI admitted to seventy-five material omissions
in FISA warrant applications in the past two years.' 37 This fact was one of
the reasons FISC gave for denying138the Attorney General's request for less
stringent minimization procedures.
A recent development also accentuates the need for greater
Congressional oversight. On November 19, 2002, the FBI admitted that it
"lost control" over a list of individuals wanted for questioning after
September 11, 2001.139 The people listed were not suspects, nor were they
explicitly linked to the terrorist attacks. 140 The main danger of the list being
posted on various websites is that those postings are out of date, and threaten
the privacy and reputations of those no longer on it.' 41 The time to consider
who watches the watchers has come.
B. Keeping The Fox Out Of The Henhouse: A Plan For Oversight
It is apparent that statutory solutions to the problems presented in this
Comment are necessary. This section will describe some of the remedial
methods available to Congress. Although the Judiciary can also play a role
in safeguarding privacy rights, a Legislative solution is needed to give the
Judiciary interpretive guidelines.
In its May 17th opinion, the FISC modified the Attorney General's
proposal to return the portions relating to minimization and information
sharing to its 1995 incarnation. 42 Since the FISC is the most experienced
court that interprets the laws in question, its modifications should carry
considerable weight when drafting appropriate legislation. To that end,
in January 2000
Congress should adopt the 1995 guidelines, as augmented
143
and August 2001, creating a new Act regulating the FBI.
This new regulatory legislation should follow the historical intent of

135. Id.
136. Guidelines, supranote 17; In re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002). The short span
of time between the May 17 opinion and the May 30 release of these Guidelines can also
be seen as a direct response to FISC from the Attorney General's office. Notwithstanding

this response, the Department of Justice nevertheless appealed FISC's decision. Id.
137. In re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 16-17.

138. Id. at 18-19.
139. Kelli Arena, U.S. Watch List Has 'Taken On Life Of Its Own,' FBI Says, CNN,
(November

20,

2002)

at

http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/1 1/19/fbi.watch.list/

index.html (last visited July 24, 2003). This list, which was originally distributed to law
enforcement agencies and select businesses, has spread via the Internet, among other
carriers. Id.
140. Id.

141. Id. Various industries can now use this list to screen potential employees. Id.
142. In re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 26-7.

143. Id.
at 14-15.
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our privacy rights, 14 4 and slow the erosion of Fourth Amendment rights. 145
This step is especially needed because the new Attorney General Guidelines
constitute an end-run around the FISC opinion and modifications., 4 6 Since
these Guidelines are essential to the lawful implementation of existing
criminal and anti-terrorist statutes, the Constitution
mandates that Congress
147
enact legislation to ensure their proper execution.
The augmented 1995 Guidelines 148 provide a less-intrusive solution to
the issues presented by the Attorney General in his appellate brief to the
FISC of Review. 149 In its opinion, the FISC outlines the elements of the
1995 Guidelines that effectively coordinate criminal and foreign intelligence
investigators, while guaranteeing that proper minimization procedures are
followed. 15 For example, they mandate that "reasonable indications of
significant federal crimes" discovered during a FISA investigation are
reported to criminal investigators.' 5' However, the Guidelines forbid FISA
investigations from being directed primarily to advance the goals of criminal
investigators.152
In addition to enacting the FISC modifications into law, Congress
should also add a provision mandating that future modifications be submitted
to Congress, or a legislatively created administrative agency, at least ninety
53
days in advance of implementation for review, comment, and public input.'
To ensure compliance with this mandate, a section including remedial
measures and emergency provisions is necessary. Remedies should take the
form of "appropriations language limiting the implementation" of the
144. See STRUM, supra note 6, at 7-10 (describing the historical basis of the Fourth
Amendment); see also Guidelines, supra note 17, at 21-22 (describing new Attorney

General Guidelines regarding counter-terrorism activities that invoke the specter of
general warrants, lowering the evidentiary standard for obtaining a warrant or wiretap
across the board).
145. See In re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 17 (detailing the erosion of Fourth
Amendment protections resulting from "inaccurate FBI affidavits," and "misstatements
in... FISA applications").
146. See Guidelines, supra note 17, at 17 (allowing the investigation of any individual
only thought "likely" to be involved in supposedly "terrorist" activities).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress
the power to, "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution... all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States." Id. Therefore, in order to properly execute the Fourth Amendment,
Congress must pass laws to balance the execution of its criminal and anti-terrorist statutes
with this enumerated right.
148. In Re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 14-15.
149. See Brief for the United States, supra note 112 (describing the Attorney General's
desire for expanded powers of investigation under FISA).
150. In Re All Matters, (FISC May 17, 2002) at 14-15.
151. Id. at 14.
152. Id. at 14-15.
153. See Berman & Dempsey, supra note 3 (proposing increased congressional
oversight of the FISA warrant process and the FBI's activities in general). This provision
would enable Congress to stay abreast of the impact that investigative procedures would
have on its constituents. Additionally, it would allow Congress time to draft further
legislation amending the proposed Act to prevent future erosion of Fourth Amendment
rights.
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modified guidelines until they have been submitted for review,1 54 and a
refusal to expend funds "implementing any future changes in Attorney
proposed guidelines have been
General Guidelines... unless such
55
transmitted to Congress for review."'
C. Solving the Problems of StatutoryInterpretation
The dissenting opinion in Konop discusses the problematic and
conflicting interpretations of "intercept" as it applies to electronic
communications.1 5 6 While this opinion discusses the law prior to the
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act,' 57 the issues presented are still
applicable to this proposal.15 8 If the precedent of the Konop majority59is
allowed to stand, a viable threat to Fourth Amendment protections exists.
For instance, as the Internet proliferates, increasingly large numbers of
people are communicating via stored electronic and wire communications.
While it is not necessary to re-define what a stored communication is, it is
necessary to ensure that what constitutes an "interception" within the
meaning of the ECPA and the Wiretap Act is uniform for both wired and
electronic communications. 60 If the current interpretations are applied, the
privacy rights of all Internet users will be severely compromised.
To prevent this severe erosion of the Fourth Amendment, Congress
should amend the pertinent statutes to specifically include stored electronic
and wire communications within the list of communications that can be
intercepted. As technology has advanced, the methods used to store wire
'6
and electronic communications have become "technologically equivalent."' '
A clear statutory statement indicating an intention to protect the "access to"
and "acquisition of' stored electronic communications would prevent further
misinterpretations of the ECPA and Wiretap Act. 162
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (describing the power of Congress to
"lay and collect Taxes"). When combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is
clear that Congress possesses the power to refuse to allocate funds, as well as the power to
allocate them. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
156. Konop, 302 F.3d at 887-88 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
157. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 50 U.S.C.).
158. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 887-88 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (discussing the
interception and investigation of stored electronic information).
159. See id. at 890 (discussing the fears computer operators may have about the

confidentiality of their private communications). Taken in conjunction with the Attorney
General Guidelines not modified by FISC, all stored wire and electronic communications
would be exempt from the warrant requirements of the ECPA and the Wiretap Act. See
Guidelines, supra note 17, at 22 (describing the freedom investigators would have to use
online resources in their investigations).
160. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 887-88 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (indicating that this
term's statutory meaning has not been firmly established by the courts). Justice
Reinhardt's dissent points out that the varying definitions of "interception" "have rendered
the intercept prohibition ... meaningless." Id. at 887.

161. Id. at 888. Justice Reinhardt continues on to discuss the legislative intent behind
the ECPA and the Wiretap Act. Id. at 888-91.
162. Id. at 889.
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The protection of privacy rights is a constant balancing act that
deserves the utmost vigilance. In addition to the proposal contained in this
63
Comment, other initiatives can be offered to further protect privacy rights.'
IV. CONCLUSION

The attacks on September 11, 2001 shocked the country. The
Executive Branch, whose duty it is to enforce the laws of the Nation, 64 must
temper its zeal to protect the nation with a commitment to protect the rights
of the People. However, without participation by all three branches of
government, this goal becomes difficult to achieve.
The reasonable expectation of privacy first posited by Justice
Brandeis, 6 5 and later refined by the Katz Court, 166 must be maintained,
regardless of the proliferation of investigative technologies. Balancing
privacy and national security is a difficult job. However, those accepting the
responsibility of this balancing act must always be vigilant to prevent a
permanent and destructive erosion of privacy rights. Our nation cannot lose
sight of the freedoms it seeks to protect.

163. For instance, in order to prevent abuse of FISA's in camera, ex parte consideration
of wiretap and warrant requests, Congress could appoint special Federal Defense
attorneys, with the security clearance to review and contest the warrants should a criminal
proceeding be brought against the target of an investigation. See also Podesta & Swire,
supra note 76 (describing the pitfalls of the current system of review for FISA warrants,
and proposing a "Committee on Privacy, Personal Liberty and Homeland Security").
However, this becomes an issue of criminal procedure and due process, which is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
164. U.S. CONST. art. 11,
§ 1,cl.1."The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." id. Possessing the power to execute the Laws, the
Executive also takes an oath to uphold the Constitution. Id. at art. II, § 8. "[H]e shall take
the following Oath or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I ...will to the
best of my Ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."
Id.
165. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). "[Every] unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id
166. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan J., concurring) (indicating that the Fourth
Amendment extends to the individual via a reasonable expectation of privacy).

